Evolving threats require evolving rules
A look at holding accountable those who carry out Russia's asymmetric attacks on the West, including a different kind of #YachtWatch
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ALEX’S WEEKLY RANT!
Last week, we saw the limits of Western legal systems when a Finnish court ruled that a case involving a Russian shadow fleet tanker was out of its jurisdiction. The Eagle S, registered in the United Arab Emirates and flagged under the Cook Islands with questionable ownership, was arrested last December after it dragged its anchor 100 kilometers (62 miles) along the seabed, cutting undersea cables and causing power outages in parts of Finland. When Finnish authorities boarded the ship, believed to be carrying sanctioned oil from Russia, they noted an anchor was missing (that is, it had dragged for so long, it fell off). Furthermore, the ship had no valid insurance policy and was in generally poor condition, with broken ventilation systems, broken radar, and a slew of fire safety concerns.
Finnish prosecutors went on to charge the ship’s captain and first mate with aggravated sabotage for damaging the undersea cables. But because the incident occurred in international waters, the court ruled it did not have jurisdiction and dropped the case.
It was a disheartening decision. Most maritime experts have said it would be impossible to drag an anchor 100 kilometers and not realize it, meaning the cutting of the cables was likely intentional: sabotage. Others have said it is impossible to know intentionality since investigators never found evidence of someone in Russia giving the order to the Eagle S to cut those specific cables. So maybe it was an accident? After all, the Baltic Sea is full of underwater infrastructure. Drop anchor and you’re bound to hit something.
The Finnish charges of aggravated sabotage looked to end that debate and make clear once and for all who is to blame for these types of asymmetrical attacks: Russia.
I have real problems with setting the standard for sabotage at uncovering the direct order from Moscow to carry out such an act. You’re almost certain never to find it. But imagine this scenario: Moscow gets a guy super drunk, spins him in circles then shoves him into an uninsured car whose steering doesn’t work properly and whose brakes are out and points the car at a field filled with babies in baby carriages. Who is responsible when that guy hits a baby carriage? There was no direct order to hit that specific baby carriage, or maybe even any baby carriage, but Moscow had to know the guy would hit something.
Is that sabotage? Gross negligence? Either way, Russia is culpable.
The fact that our legal system couldn’t manage the fall out, well, that’s on us.
Magnus Winberg, a sea captain and lecturer in navigation at Aboa Mare Maritime Academy in Finland, succinctly outlined the current problem (emphasis mine):
It has long been clear that what happens in international waters is handled by the flag state, and in national waters by the port state. But the Russian shadow fleet has placed itself outside all existing systems. Our system has been destroyed, and now no one knows what is going on.
Yes, Russia continues to find ways to operate outside existing systems of law, placing our own Rule of Law in jeopardy. Winberg continued:
We must create systems where we can access errors and outright criminal activity. Unfortunately, it takes a long time, but it is necessary. If some players do not follow the rules, we must create a system where we can access them too.
We can’t just throw our hands up and say, well it was in international waters, I guess there’s nothing we can do. That critical infrastructure along the seabed belongs to sovereign nations—in this case Finland, Sweden, and Estonia—even if it lies in international waters. It might take time, but we need to find ways to hold accountable those who are operating outside our current system of accountability.
Speaking of holding people accountable for helping Russia
We saw a little bit of success recently in Estonia (not surprising) and the United Kingdom (more surprising).
Estonia sentenced one of its own, Svetlana Burceva, to six years in prison for violating sanctions and for treason. Burceva violated international sanctions by working for the Russian state media company RIA Rossiya Segodnya, whose director is sanctioned. By writing articles for RIA Rossiya Segodnya/Baltnews and taking photos to accompany the articles, she made resources available to a sanctioned individual, according to the indictment.
But that isn’t all Burceva is guilty of. She also had a relationship with an FSB reserve officer whose company supports Russia’s information warfare and influence operations. The FSB officer was a guest lecturer in the master’s program “Information and Hybrid Conflicts” at Sevastopol State University and helped recruit future influence agents from among the students. With his support, Burceva wrote articles and a book to help influence audiences in Estonia and elsewhere with Kremlin narratives. Yet another example of putting a local face on Russian-manipulated information.
Farther West, former UK Member of European Parliament Nathan Gill (UKIP, i.e. the party that brought you Brexit) pleaded guilty to bribery for accepting money from a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician named Oleg Voloshyn to write and say specific things to benefit Russia, including in the European parliament.
Oleg Voloshyn, the guy who was paying and handing out tasks to Gill, once worked for former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych before Yanukovych fled to Moscow in the wake of Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity. Voloshyn was also a business partner of Paul Manafort, Donald Trump’s one-time campaign manager. When the US Department of Treasury sanctioned Voloshyn, here is what they said:
Russia has directed its intelligence services to recruit current and former Ukrainian government officials to prepare to take over the government of Ukraine and to control Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with an occupying Russian force. At the heart of this effort… [is] Oleh Voloshyn (Voloshyn), [a] current Ukrainian Member of Parliament from the party led by Victor Medvedchuk (Medvedchuk), who is already subject to U.S. sanctions for his role in undermining Ukrainian sovereignty in 2014. Medvedchuk maintains close ties with the Kremlin, and also took part in directing these activities. [...] Voloshyn has worked with Russian actors to undermine Ukrainian government officials and advocate on behalf of Russia. Voloshyn also worked with U.S.-designated Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian national with ties to Russian intelligence who was sanctioned for attempts to influence the U.S. 2020 presidential election, to coordinate passing on information to influence U.S. elections at the behest of Russia.
For some background on Viktor Medvedchuk, see this. And for information on his Voice of Europe media platform aimed at European audiences, see here.
So, Gill, the UK politician who wanted to take the UK out of the European Union because “sovereignty” and “Britain First”, pleaded guilty to being paid by Voloshyn, a Ukrainian-Russian guy with connections to Russian intelligence and Trump’s one-time campaign manager Manafort, to write and say pro-Russia things. Not sure how subjecting oneself to Russian directives makes “Britain First”. I wonder if he’s the only one?
THE WEEK’S LINKS
A roundup of things you should be reading
HOW TO BEAT RUSSIA
Putin Is Escalating His War (NYT)
Nato weighs armed response to Vladimir Putin’s hybrid war (FT)
EU to curb Russian diplomats’ travel as suspected spy attacks mount (FT)
FEELING PESSIMISTIC?
A utopian future is still possible (just) (FT)
EXCELLENT RESOURCES!
Just Security has launched WHAT JUST HAPPENED? as well as a litigation tracker to help readers keep up with the chaos
Alex Finley is a former officer of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, where she served in West Africa and Europe. She writes and teaches about terrorism, disinformation / covert influence, and oligarch yachts. Her writing has appeared in Slate, Reductress, Funny or Die, POLITICO, The Center for Public Integrity, and other publications. She has spoken to the BBC, MSNBC, CNN, C-SPAN’s Washington Journal, France24, and numerous other media outlets. She was also invited once to speak at Harvard, which she now tells everyone within the first ten seconds of meeting them. She is the author of the Victor Caro series, satirical novels about the CIA. Before joining the CIA, Alex was a journalist, covering Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, and the Department of Energy. She reported on issues related to national security, intelligence, and homeland security. Did she mention she was invited to speak at Harvard?
Honest question (I haven’t spent years studying and thinking about this as you have):
Should Europe, the US (?) Japan, Australia and other democratic countries committed to the rule of law (let’s assume that the U.S. is able to beat back our wannabe authoritarians within) treat the Russian shadow fleet and their sanctions busting, sabotaging of communication lines, and launching of drones as a matter for law enforcement and courts or should we treat the shadow fleet as a matter for spies, counter spies, and covert operations?
Or something in between where countries use “asset forfeiture to seize ships & oil” and accuse everyone on board with espionage and hold them indefinitely.