As we uncover Russia's influence operations, Russia turns to Hungary as a cutout
A number of US legal actions last week revealed new details about Russia's fuckery in the West. What happens now that Russia knows we know what they are doing?
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ALEX’S WEEKLY RANT
A number of US legal actions last week revealed new details about Russia's fuckery in the West. They are certainly only the tip of the iceberg, and Hungary looks to be the new workaround, now that these operations have been uncovered.
We’ve had a flood of Russian influence operations-related news in just the past few days. A US Department of Justice indictment revealed that several popular right-wing influencers have been on the Kremlin’s payroll. A separate FBI affidavit outlined one of Russia’s plans to interfere in the 2024 US presidential election, complete with company documents laying out methods, key performance indicators, and objectives—a Trump victory—as well as Russian plans to manipulate the media ecosystem in the US and Europe with spoofed media sites (part of Operation Doppelgänger). A separate Department of Justice indictment revealed how Russia’s notorious GRU unit 29155—which has been involved in assassinations, poisonings, sabotage, and more—has a new cyber unit involved in cyber sabotage. The Department of Justice also indicted Dmitri Simes, who, during the 2016 election, wrote the Russia section of Trump’s first major foreign policy speech and who appears multiple times in Robert Mueller’s Russia report. Meanwhile, the list of Russian acts of sabotage (and attempted sabotage) in the West continues to grow (see the Week’s Links below for more, and for some background on sabotage ops, see this past Rant!).
Today, I am going to focus on the right-wing influencers and Doppelgänger, but the flood of legal action serves as a reminder that Russia continues its multi-pronged efforts to fuck with us. And it is a sure thing that the ops outlined here are only the ones we’ve found out about so far. There are many, many more that are still ongoing.
RT and the Right Wing
After the US and Europe shut down RT (formerly Russia Today) due to its being a state-funded propaganda platform, the Kremlin was forced to look for new ways to get its narratives out into the world. One tactic has been to fund other media platforms. The money and editorial direction still come from RT, but the name and personalities of the platform appear independent. As the editor-in-chief of RT has put it, they created an “entire empire of covert projects” whose objective is to shape the opinion of “Western audiences.”
There are several examples of this, but this particular indictment is about two RT employees funding and directing Tenet media, a right-wing media platform based in Tennessee that employs some of the biggest right-wing influencers in the US, including Benny Johnson, Tim Pool, and Lauren Southern. (Don’t worry if those names are unfamiliar to you. I hope they are; it means you are getting your information from a healthier media ecosystem.)
According to the indictment, two RT employees funneled nearly $10 million to Tenet through various shell companies. The RT employees were allowed editorial control of some content produced by Tenet’s personalities, but also were allowed to post some of their own content (produced, covertly, by RT, without letting the audience know that).
I was going to explain the entire structure of the operation, but
already created this excellent graphic, and I saw no point recreating the wheel. The US company in the blue box below is Tenet. The Commentators at the bottom are Johnson, Pool, Southern, and the others. Also, Founders 1 and 2 are Lauren Chen and her husband, Liam Donovan, both of whom used to work for RT. The two producers in the chart below also were formerly RT producers. The bottom line: The Kremlin was controlling the messaging coming from Tenet.
Some key points:
Chen and Donovan knew they were getting money from Russia.
DOJ is in possession of correspondence between Tenet’s founders Chen and Donovan, saying things like, “So we're billing the Russians from the corporation, right?” and “also I say we bill the russians for the last month once we're done the extra opeds.” One even commented in a chat that Russia had offered paid leave, meaning, not only did they know the money was coming from Russia, they understood they were working for Russia. Again, both Chen and Donovan used to be RT employees themselves. Looks like that never changed!
Chen and Donovan allegedly deceived two Tenet commentators, but Tenet has six commentators.
According to the DOJ indictment, Tenet founders Chen and Donovan allegedly helped the Russians deceive two Tenet commentators about whom they were working for, using the fake persona “Eduard Grigoriann” (shown in Asha’s graphic)—who posed as a rich donor—to convince them Tenet was a legitimate company. However, Tenet has six commentators. This implies the other four were not deceived. Did those four know they were working for Russia?
“Pre-existing political opinions”? I don’t think so.
The Tenet influencers are claiming they had no idea they were being paid by Russia, insisting their words were all their own. Many right-wing news outlet and GOP personalities, like Fox’s Jeanine Pirro and Senator Marco Rubio, have similarly claimed these right-wing influencers were simply stating “pre-existing political opinions,” as Rubio put it, adding that they were victims.
However, we know from the DOJ indictment that excuse doesn’t hold water. After the ISIS terror attack on the Crocus shopping mall in Moscow—for which ISIS publicly claimed credit, and as evidence pointed to—the Kremlin wanted to pin the blame for the attack on the US and Ukraine. One of the RT employees wrote to Chen, specifically asking Chen to find a commentator to push the narrative that the US and Ukraine were responsible for the Crocus mall attack. Chen responded that Commentator-3 said “he’s happy to cover it.” That, my friends, is directed messaging, not a “pre-existing political opinion.”
“Pre-existing political opinions” also is not the defense these guys think it is.
Even if some of the opinions espoused by these Tenet influencers were organically their own, perhaps they should ask why they line up so well with those of the Kremlin and why the Kremlin—which wants to weaken the US—might be willing to pay them $100,000 a week to say such things?
Tenet pushed RT content, without revealing it was coming from RT.
Once Tenet was up and running, one of the RT employees helped out with editorial tasks, such as editing content, but she also used the Tenet platform to amplify RT content. She did this by sending content to Tenet and insisting the six commentators get it out through their pre-existing networks/audiences, thus magnifying the RT content disguised as Tenet content. The RT employee imposed metrics on the Tenet commentators, insisting on “At least one share per day. Not one share per week.” Eventually, the RT employee did not even need to go through any Tenet employee. She was able to post RT content directly on the Tenet platform, giving, as DOJ put it, “unfettered access to serve RT messaging to [Tenet’s] audiences.”
In 2024, one of the RT employees circulated to Tenet staff approximately 841 video clips, which were then posted and amplified through Tenet social media accounts. Let’s break that down, using August 31, the 243rd day of the year, as the cutoff date (since the indictment is from September). That would mean Tenet amplified more than three videos a day for RT. And note here, some Tenet videos were getting 16 million views. That’s not nothing.
Right-wing influencers are not profitable.
One of Tenet’s commentators was being paid (by Russia) $400,000 a month for four videos per week. Another was being paid (by Russia) $100,000 a week for one video per week. We don’t (yet) know what the others were being paid. However, we do know that Tenet did not generate enough revenue through ads and subscriptions to cover that. Indeed, a full 90 percent of Tenet’s revenues came from Russia. This also undermines the influencers like Tim Pool who say they needn’t have questioned such high payments since they were being paid “market value.” No, they weren’t, since clearly the content they created wasn’t earning a profit. At all.
Let’s look at the budget.
These amounts seem like a lot at first glance. Wow! Russia was willing to pay a million dollars a month on influence operations! But actually, this is way cheaper than funding tanks, soldiers, and ammunition. It accomplishes a major goal—destabilizing the adversary—at a way lower cost.
The MAGA tie in.
Tenet founder Lauren Chen is a regular in the MAGA mediascape. She has contributed to Charlie Kirk’s Turning Point USA, as well as Fox News, OAN, Newsmax, and PragerU. There is a reason MAGA talking points sound remarkably similar to those coming from Russia.
Have Chen and Donovan flipped?
Interestingly, the DOJ indictment of the two RT employees includes tons of information about alleged wrongdoing by Chen and Donovan, and yet, they are not charged. One theory is that they were indicted under seal and have flipped and are providing information to prosecutors.
Don’t think for a moment that Tenet is the only US platform paid by Russia.
Tenet is the tip of the iceberg. We know of other media platforms in Europe and Africa funded by the Kremlin. There is absolutely no way, zero, that Tenet is unique in the US.
New Details About Operation Doppelgänger
Also last week, the FBI announced it had seized 32 web domain names, after it was discovered that Russia had used spoofed versions of legitimate news sites (this is called “cybersquatting”) as well as created original brands, in order to spread Russian narratives while hiding the Russian government’s hand. We already knew about this operation, called Doppelgänger, but the DOJ affidavit provides fascinating details about the operation.
Some key points:
The Kremlin used professional PR firms to develop malign influence campaigns.
These influence campaigns were not ad hoc, but rather were carefully designed, outlining objectives, targeted audiences, budgets, and metrics. Once the messaging was developed the companies running these ops used influencers, paid social media advertising, and fake social media accounts with links to the spoofed news sites, in order trick people into believing they were visiting a legitimate news site. Spoofed sites included (in the US) Fox News and the Washington Post and (in Europe) Bild, Der Spiegel, and The Guardian. In fact, the op spoofed media sites in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the US, Turkey, Switzerland, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, even Russia, and more.
The campaigns had clear objectives.
According to minutes from a meeting between the PR companies and the Kremlin, the group agreed that “first and foremost, we need to discredit the USA, Great Britain and NATO, and secondly, we need to convey the truth about the war in Ukraine.” The group also noted the need to convince Germans to oppose the “inefficient politics of sanctions.” Campaigns aimed to achieve these objectives by, for example, exploiting racial, political, and religious tensions.
It wasn’t us!
As with the Tenet story above, Russia was using the Doppelgänger op to hide the fact that the messaging was coming from Russia. In documents obtained by the FBI, one Russian from a PR agency wrote the following instructions from a meeting with the Kremlin, “When providing a narrative it’s important to remember that this is ‘from a German to a German’, ‘from a Frenchman to a Frenchman’!” As I’ve noted ad nauseam, putting a local face on a narrative is important, so the audience believes it is coming from one of their own, and not from Russia. It makes it easier for the audience to accept the narrative. It also provides deniability, so Russia can say, “It wasn’t us!”
These influence campaigns were briefed to Putin.
The group kept Russian President Putin informed of the progress of their campaigns.
More metrics!
The Russians love their metrics, almost as much as American and EU bureaucrats. These influence campaigns outlined Key Performance Indicators, or KPIs (and yes, that’s the term they use!), like 200 memes per month, or 300 social media comments per day.
Russia was monitoring social media accounts to see who might be a good influencer for them. This is called “targeting.”
Russia was monitoring 2800 people on different social media sites whom they believed were influencers who would help spread Russia’s messaging. Those people include television and radio hosts, politicians, bloggers, journalists, businessmen, professors, think-tank analysts, veterans, professors, and comedians, according to the FBI, which added that “When referring to politicians, the list often mentioned which U.S. state and/or political party they represent and the position they hold in Congress. The U.S.-based influencers accounted for approximately 21% of the accounts being monitored by” one of the Russian PR agencies. This means Russia was on the lookout for any influencers who might be good vectors for Russian messaging.
Russia wants a GOP win.
One of the influence campaigns Russia was running is called Project Good Old USA. It was briefed to Putin. The narratives were meant to play on Americans’ fears (immigrants are stealing your jobs, America is no longer safe, poverty and crime are everywhere, things like that) and were targeted at specific groups of people, including certain US politicians, right-wing influencers, and the gaming community (which the Russians identified as a bastion of far-right ideology).
The campaign also used specific demographic information to target 18 communities in swing states. This is particularly interesting since it requires granular knowledge of where to focus the campaign. Of note, former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort, back in 2016, provided internal polling data to his Russian intelligence friend Konstantin Kilimnik; I wonder if he is providing similar information now, which is being used to help target specific communities in swing states?
The objective of Project Good Old USA is very clear: “To secure victory of a Republican candidate (Trump or one of his current internal opponents) at the US Presidential elections.”
Russian Sleeper Cells
Although the FBI has seized many of the domains that were pushing these narratives, the Russians created what they call “sleeper” platforms, which push out neutral and/or entertaining messaging to lure in an audience, and then slowly start introducing Russian messaging. As I said, what we know now is certainly only the tip of the iceberg.
For additional information about Doppelgänger and tips for making sure you are getting good information from good sources, check out Class 17: Verifying news sites.
What Happens Now That Russia Knows We Know?
Russian money funding right-wing influencers may no longer be tenable. So, what might be Russia’s solution? Use a cutout.
Enter: Hungary and Viktor Orban.
Russia has begun using Hungarian organizations to help feed its messaging into right-wing networks. Orban has twice visited Trump at Mar-a-Lago and Hungary’s state-funded Danube Institute has forged an alliance with the US’s Heritage Institute, home of Project 2025, the policy blueprint for a Republican administration.
As Politico recently revealed, Hungarian money has funded a number of US influencers and journalists (the same is happening in Europe, which I wrote about here), including the Conservative Partnership Institute, which Politico describes as “a nerve center for incubating policies for a second Trump administration.”
Many of the influencers from Tenet, in fact, have been paid by Hungary. Lauren Chen, one of Tenet’s founders, recently spoke at MCC Feszt, a bastion of Orbanism.
According to Politico, “Orbán told U.S. activists two years ago that he had ‘perfected the recipe’ for an ‘illiberal state,’ which he wanted to share with other governments. Last month, Orbán publicly claimed to be helping the Trump campaign to draft policy.”
Many of those policies and accompanying narratives sound eerily familiar to those pushed by the Kremlin in their influence campaigns.
But maybe that’s just a coincidence.
THE WEEK’S LINKS
A roundup of things you should be reading
RUSSIAN SABOTAGE
Norway’s spy chief sees Russia more likely to attempt sabotage (Reuters)
Poland neutralises sabotage group linked to Belarus and Russia (Reuters)
Germany blames Russian GRU unit for EU, NATO cyberattacks (DW)
RUSSIA AND CHINA
‘Dragon-Bear’: How China and Russia’s spy operations overlap in Europe (Politico)
Alex Finley is a former officer of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, where she served in West Africa and Europe. She writes and teaches about terrorism, disinformation / covert influence, and oligarch yachts. Her writing has appeared in Slate, Reductress, Funny or Die, POLITICO, The Center for Public Integrity, and other publications. She has spoken to the BBC, MSNBC, CNN, C-SPAN’s Washington Journal, France24, and numerous other media outlets. She was also invited once to speak at Harvard, which she now tells everyone within the first ten seconds of meeting them. She is the author of the Victor Caro series, satirical novels about the CIA. Before joining the CIA, Alex was a journalist, covering Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, and the Department of Energy. She reported on issues related to national security, intelligence, and homeland security. Did she mention she was invited to speak at Harvard?
Counter ops needed.
So freaking amused to imagine KPI analyses going on at troll farms in Moscow.